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The Ancient Constitution,  
Common Law and the Idyll  
of Albion: Law and Lawyers  
in Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2
Paul Raffield
Abstract. In Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2 Shakespeare provides an image of the unifying function of law 
in a disjointed society. This article examines the depiction in these plays of an idealized legal system, 
whose agents subscribe to the axioms of an equitable jurisprudence, in which kings are subject to an 
unwritten moral law. The central role played by common lawyers in shaping the development of the 
ancient constitution is considered by reference to two of the principal players in Henry IV, Part 2: 
the Lord Chief Justice and Justice Shallow. The influence of several judges of the early modern period 
(especially the Lancastrian Chief Justice, Sir John Fortescue) over the depiction of these two charac-
ters is analyzed. In the second part of the article the various models of fatherhood offered in the plays 
are examined. The correlation between paternity and the mystical nature of kingship provides the ba-
sis for the final section of the article, in which is considered the possible influence of Plowden’s Report 
of the Case of the Duchy of Lancaster over the formulation of Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2.
Keywords: Shakespeare; Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2; Justice Shallow; Lord Chief Justice; ancient 
constitution; Sir John Fortescue; common lawyers; Edmund Plowden
I n t r o d u c t I o n
In his great diptych of the English state, Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2, Shakespeare 
provides a sustained image of the unifying function of law in a disjointed so-
ciety. It is the purpose of this article to examine the depiction in these plays of 
an idealized legal system, whose agents subscribe to the axioms of an equitable 
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jurisprudence in which kings are subject to the imperatives of unwritten law. 
I analyze the central role played by common lawyers in shaping the develop-
ment of the ancient constitution, by reference to two of the principal players 
in Henry IV, Part 2: the Lord Chief Justice and Justice Shallow. I consider the 
influence of several judges of the early modern period (the most significant of 
whom in this context is the Lancastrian Chief Justice, Sir John Fortescue) over 
the depiction of these two characters, both of whom provide multifaceted rep-
resentations of common lawyers.
Fatherhood is a ubiquitous theme in Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2, and in psy-
choanalytical terms is relevant to an understanding of the emotional power of 
law to control the imagination of its subjects, binding them into a state of al-
legiance to a symbolic father or original.1 In the second part of the article I ex-
amine the various models of fatherhood offered in the plays, predicated upon 
Prince Hal’s relationship with his actual father, King Henry IV; his surrogate 
and antithetical father, Falstaff; and the symbolic father of the law, the Lord 
Chief Justice. The correlation between paternity, filial relations, and the mys-
tical nature of kingship provides the basis for the final section of the article, in 
which I consider the possible influence of Plowden’s Report of the Case of the 
Duchy of Lancaster on the formulation of Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2.
Sacerdotes or Rabulae Forenses?  
Images of the Elizabethan Lawyer
The development in the sixteenth century of a standardized, self-regulating 
legal profession was instrumental in diminishing the relevance of its sacer-
dotal role, as proclaimed by Sir John Fortescue in De Laudibus Legum An-
gliae. Fortescue’s characterization of the judiciary as “sacerdotes” or priests, 
whose primary role is to teach “Holy Things,”2 implies a jurisprudence that 
is coexistent with and indivisible from the Word of God. As forensic rhetoric 
attained unprecedented levels of emphasis in the education of common law-
yers during the sixteenth century, so the practice of law and the practices of 
lawyers became associated in the public imagination more with trickery than 
divinity. Still less did the spiritual correlation between lawyers and priests, 
made in the previous century by Fortescue, appear to have any basis in reality. 
Late Elizabethan jurists such as William Fulbecke conflated the temporal and 
spiritual aspects of common law, arguing that “though the charge and calling 
be seculer, yet it must be religiously handled. For God is the author of the 
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Law, and the revenger of the abuse thereof.”3 Despite the biblical tone of Ful-
becke’s injunction against irreligious conduct, it seems that Sir John Dode-
ridge more accurately reflected the popular perception of lawyers at the end 
of the sixteenth century when he argued that “[t]he first and chiefest Natural 
gift [of the common lawyer] is sharpenesse, and dexterity of wit.”4 Indeed, in 
his popular, satirical comic drama, Law-Trickes or, Who Would Have Thought 
It, John Day implies that the preeminent skills of the barrister are those of dis-
simulation. The character of Polymetes is described as:
A parlous youth, sharpe and satyricall,
Would a but spend some study in the law,
A would prove a passing subtle Barrister.5
It was the acquisition merely of “sharp” and “subtle” skills at the Inns of 
Court to which the scholar, poet, and lawyer, Abraham Fraunce, objected 
most strongly in The Lawiers Logike, published in 155. Fraunce was not op-
posed to the learning of rhetorical skills per se; rather it was the absence of any 
logical, structural, or ethical basis to legal education that he found most of-
fensive and least conducive to the creation of a distinguished legal profession. 
Legal education of this period was predicated upon the rehearsal of disputa-
tious skills. Cases were “pleadyd and declared in homely Law-french” by 
inner-barristers (law students); after which, an utter-barrister (qualified ad-
vocate) “doth reherse, and doth argue and reason to it in the Law-frenche.”6 
Similarly, at “readings,” after the Reader had given a lecture on a particu-
lar legal issue, he would offer up cases, which would be disputed by utter-
barristers and Benchers: “The Judges and Benchers argue according to their 
antiquity, the puisne [subordinate] Bencher beginning first; and so everyone 
after another.”7
For many students, the rhetorical and procedural skills that they acquired 
at the Inns were applied to the administration of large country estates, when 
they returned to their familial homes after several years of study in London. 
As Fortescue accurately noted, sons of the gentry were sent to the Inns of 
Court, “not so much to make the Laws their Study, much less to live by the 
Profession (having large Patrimonies of their own)”;8 but the acquisition of 
some basic tenets of property law would serve them well in the subsequent 
management of their land. Fraunce was highly critical of this practice, citing 
it as an example of the failings of an education that produced legal techno-
crats rather than juristic scholars: “[H]aving in seaven years space met with six 
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French words, home they ryde lyke brave Magnificoes, and dashe their poore 
neighboures children quyte out of countenance, with Villen in gros, Villen re-
gardant, and Tenant per le curtesie.”9 The absence of any philosophical, criti-
cal, or ethical context to legal education led Fraunce to claim that the study of 
common law was “hard, harsh, unpleasant, unsavoury, rude and barbarous”; 
as a consequence of which, the lawyers produced were “so many upstart Ra-
bulae Forenses, which under a pretence of Lawe, become altogeather lawless, 
to the continuall molestation of ignorant men, and generall overcharging of 
the country.”10
For popular dramatists such as John Day and John Marston, the avarice, 
pride, and dissemblance of lawyers made them obvious targets of derision in 
their satirical plays. Hence, in Marston’s Histrio-Mastix, performed for an au-
dience of lawyers at the Middle Temple in 1599, the two protagonists, lawyers 
called Furcher and Vourcher, describe “sweet contention” as “Lawyers best 
content.” In a parody of the medieval morality play, Marston introduces into 
his farce the allegorical character of Pride. Upon seeing Furcher and Vourcher 
(who were presumably attired in legal costume), Pride exclaims:
O these be Lawyers! Concords enemies,
Prydes fuell shall their fire of strife increase . . .
. . . Then use your wisdom to enrich your selves,
Make deepe successe high Steward of your store.11
Whilst Marston and Day directed their satire at the perceived venality of 
lawyers; Shakespeare’s interest in the law was primarily in exploring models 
of governance and their twofold effect: on the development of the state and 
on individual subjects of law.
Lex Terrae, Common Lawyers and the Pastoral Idyll:  
“a goodly dwelling, and a rich”
Less than ten miles to the south of Stratford-upon-Avon is the village of 
Ebrington. Along a narrow, winding road, a couple of miles to the west of the 
main thoroughfare from Stratford to Cirencester (the ancient Fosse Way), it 
sits on top of a hill, just inside the Gloucestershire border with Warwickshire. 
The road, which leads to Chipping Campden, is lined intermittently with 
pretty sand-colored cottages, built from the local Cotswold stone. It winds 
upwards past the village inn, reaching its highest point at the parish church 
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of St. Eadburgha, from whose ancient churchyard the view extends over a 
landscape of meadows, orchards, copses, and farm buildings to the Vale of 
Evesham in the west, Cirencester and the lower dip-slopes of the Cotswold 
Hills in the south, and the market town of Stratford-upon-Avon in the north.
The surrounding countryside of Gloucestershire and Warwickshire pres-
ents a vision of rural England that Lord Denning regularly invoked in his 
more idiosyncratic judgments; for example, in New Windsor Corporation v. 
Mellor:
Today we look back far in time. To a town or village green. The turf is old. 
Animals have grazed there for hundreds of years. Nowadays there are pleasant 
stretches of grass where people sit and talk. Sometimes they play cricket or kick 
a ball about. But in medieval times it was the place where the young men mus-
tered with their bows and arrows. There might be stocks there where offenders 
were put for their petty misdemeanours. In the month of May they set up a 
maypole and danced around it. We have no record of when it all began.12
Noting Lord Denning’s “attraction to the pastoral,” Dennis R. Klinck re-
marks of this particular judgment that “the nostalgia is almost palpable.”13 
Denning evokes a sense of timelessness, suggesting (as jurists of the early 
modern period commented of the common law itself ) that the customs of 
rural England have existed since time immemorial.14 Roger Sales describes 
pastoralism as “nostalgia for the good old days,”15 implying that such days 
exist only in the imagination. It is axiomatic of Denning’s judgment in Mellor 
and in other cases that the England for which he yearns is a pastoral vision of 
nationhood rather than a statement of historical fact.16 As Peter Goodrich has 
observed, the study of common law is as much to do with the study of tradi-
tion as it is with the acquisition of technical knowledge;17 in which case, myth, 
memory, and the image are as relevant to the accretion of a body of law as 
the law reports, the texts of jurists, and the legislation of Parliament and the 
courts.
In terms of historical accuracy, Denning might have been referring in the 
above case “to a past which was never present”:18 a quasi-fictional “merrie 
England” of maypoles, village cricket, grazing cattle, and eternal summers. 
Had he visited the Gloucestershire village of Ebrington, Denning would have 
lauded the physical manifestation of the unwritten ancient constitution, which 
his judgments invariably evoke and which Ebrington appears to embody. A 
constitution, particularly when it is unwritten, represents an aspiration rather 
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than merely a legalistic set of rules. That aspiration takes the form of diverse 
images, drawn from the memory of an ideal past and the projection of an op-
timal future. Ian Ward has succinctly defined a constitution as “a mentality; a 
collective impression, of past, present and future,”19 and Denning is certainly 
not alone among the judiciary in appealing to an idealized past as a paradigm 
for the present and the future. Sir Edward Coke frequently adopted a similar 
rhetorical style, as for example, in Calvin’s Case:
[W]e are but of yesterday, (and therefore had need of the wisdom of those that 
were before us) and had been ignorant (if we had not received light and knowl-
edge from our forefathers) and our days upon the earth but as a shadow, in 
respect of the old ancient days and times past, wherein the laws have been by 
the wisdom of the most excellent men, in many successions of ages, by long and 
continual experience.20
The judicial careers of Coke and Denning, although separated by nearly 
four hundred years, were identical in their dedication to preserving the un-
broken chain of English law, by which the juridical past might be linked to the 
present.21 The venerable sages of the English legal profession, the appellate 
judges, profess to protect and propound the timeless reason of common law 
for the benefit of its subjects.22
The themes of time and timelessness, and the sense of past deeds acting 
upon the present, pervade the autumnal tone of Henry IV, Part 2. Not only is 
the English countryside the nostalgic idyll of Lord Denning’s poetic imagi-
nation; it is also the home of Shakespeare’s Justice Shallow, whose Glouc-
estershire home and its surrounding orchard provide the setting for much 
wistful reverie. In Justice Shallow, Shakespeare gives the legal profession its 
nostalgic counterpoint to the unsentimental pragmatism of his Lord Chief 
Justice, whose “bold, just, and impartial spirit”23 is in sharp contrast to the 
discursive meanderings of Shallow: the “poor esquire of this county, and one 
of the King’s justices of the peace.”24 These two facets of the English legal 
tradition, what might be termed the pragmatic and the nostalgic, were united 
in the person of Sir John Fortescue, Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor 
in the turbulent reign of King Henry VI.25 The preface to John Selden’s edi-
tion of Fortescue’s De Laudibus Legum Angliae informs the reader that “He 
lies buried in the Parish Church belonging to Ebburton, (now written more 
frequently Ebrington,) where in the Chancel there is a Monument erected for 
him.” Ebrington was Fortescue’s home, “where he was settled: Which Manor 
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and Lands he had by Sale from Sir Robert Corbett, as by Deed declared 35 Hen. 
VI.”26 The monument to a descendant of Sir John Fortescue, Denzil George 
(6th Earl Fortescue, 193–1977), stands in the grounds of the same church as 
that of his illustrious predecessor; a testament to the immutable continuity of 
English law.
Ebrington Manor and its orchards may or may not have been the inspira-
tion for the Gloucestershire scenes in Henry IV, Part 2, but it is extremely 
likely that De Laudibus influenced the depiction of the English legal insti-
tution in Parts 1 and 2. In particular, Fortescue ’s portrayal of the paternal 
relationship between the young Prince and “a certain grave old Knight, his 
Father’s Chancellor,”27 finds echoes in the three models of fatherhood pre-
sented in the two plays: between Hal and his actual father, King Henry IV, 
and with his two surrogate fathers, the Lord Chief Justice and Falstaff. Writ-
ten in or around 1470, and published in Latin in 1545,28 De Laudibus “was 
first translated and published, together with its English Version, by Robert 
Mulcaster” in 1599.29 Shakespeare may have read it in Latin or obtained a 
translation in manuscript form, prior to its first publication in English;30 in-
deed, a probable translator during the reign of Elizabeth I was another Sir 
John Fortescue, a descendant of the author of De Laudibus, who served as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Privy Councillor. Significantly, he was 
also a language tutor to the Queen, “being a great Master of the Greek and 
Latin Tongues.”31
I consider later the paternal theme and its reflection of belief in an ultimate 
source of legitimate authority. For now, I remain in the orchards of Glouces-
tershire to analyze the central importance of rural England to Shakespeare’s 
(and Fortescue’s) comprehension of the English state and its governance. In 
his discussion of the Gloucestershire scenes in Part 2, E. M. W. Tillyard refers 
to them as “the symbol of the undefeated operating of the country life.”32 
Tillyard does not elaborate on this assertion, but it is reasonable to infer from 
his comment the belief that, in the midst of upheaval and rebellion, the time-
less values of rural existence, based on respect for custom and man’s congru-
ency with nature, will prevail and flourish.
The role of Justice of the Peace was crucial in establishing the authority 
of the monarch, in absentia: he was the legitimate image in the shires of the 
King’s law. The office of Justice of the Peace was established by statute in the 
reign of Edward III (1.Ed.3.cap.15), although William Lambarde (writing in 
1579) noted that “before the tyme of K. Edward the third, there were sundry 
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persons, that hadde interest in the keeping of the Peace.”33 As prescribed by 
34.E.3.cap.1, “in everie Shire, one Lorde, and with him three (or foure) of the 
Best in the Countie, and some learned in the Lawes” were appointed by the 
King’s Commission to keep the peace and restrain offenders.34 In the reign of 
Richard II, two statutes were passed to restrict the number of justices in 
any county to five (12.R.2.cap.10 and 14.R.2.cap.11): the post brought with it 
power and payment, and “ambition so multiplied the number of those Iustices, 
that it was afterward high time to make a contrarie law to diminish them.”35 
Centralization of government and expansion of administration under succes-
sive Tudor monarchs necessitated large increases in the numbers of Justices 
of the Peace; as Lambarde notes, “the growing number of the Statute laws 
committed from time to time to the charge of the Iustices of ye Peace, hath 
bene the cause that they also are nowe againe increased to the overflowing of 
each Shire.”36
It is noteworthy from Lambarde’s analysis that he interprets the primary 
role of the Justice of the Peace, from its earliest statutory inception in the 
reign of Edward III, as that of conducting vigilant surveillance of the king’s 
subjects: “in every Shire, the king himself should place speciall eyes and 
watches over the common people, that shoulde bee bothe willing and wise to 
foresee, and bee also enabled with meete auctoritie to represse al intention of 
uproare and force.”37 This stark and oppressive interpretation of justice in the 
shires calls into question the efficacy of the ancient constitution, which was 
purported by Fortescue and other early modern jurists to protect the liberty of 
subjects and their inalienable rights, irrespective of social status. It is instruc-
tive briefly to consider the depiction of “the common people” of the shires in 
De Laudibus. In a chapter entitled “The Inconveniencies in France by Means 
of the Absolute Regal Government,” Fortescue is forthright in his condemna-
tion of an unjust political system in which “the Peasants live in great Hard-
ship and Misery.” The Chancellor leaves the Prince in no doubt that a major 
cause of “this cruel oppressive Treatment” is an inequitable system of taxa-
tion under which the French peasantry bear a disproportionate fiscal burden, 
while “The Nobility and Gentry are not so much burthened with Taxes.”38 
At no point in De Laudibus does Fortescue refer specifically to the English 
peasantry. Rather, he describes in general terms “the Advantages consequent 
from that Political Mixt Government which obtains in England.” He alludes 
to a hierarchic social structure in which “Every one, according to his Rank, 
hath all Things which conduce to make Life Easy and Happy.” Above all else, 
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the England of De Laudibus is an agrarian society, “constantly governed by 
the same Customs,” and the social “rank” of any English subject was the im-
mutable product of those customs.39
It is over the issue of customary law that J. G. A. Pocock has identified a 
central flaw in the deductive argument employed by Fortescue in De Laudi-
bus. If laws are to be accounted rational and therefore just, then they should 
be deduced from principles of natural justice, rather than being predicated 
upon national or local customs.40 But Fortescue is adamant that the laws of 
England are better than those of any other nation-state or of any empire (no-
tably those of the Venetians and the Romans) on grounds of their antiquity 
alone; on which basis “the Laws and Customs of England are not only Good, 
but the very Best.”41 As Pocock observes, logic such as this can hardly be de-
scribed as rational, based as it is on a “technical and traditional” interpretation 
of customary law;42 but the justification that is offered by Fortescue for the 
superiority of English law over all rival legal systems is perhaps closest to the 
distinction, later to be made by Sir Edward Coke, that “causes which concern 
the life . . . of [the King’s] subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason, but 
by the artificial reason and judgment of law.”43
What then is the essence of this artificial reason, which makes the com-
mon law unique among western legal systems and renders it better than any 
of its rivals? Fortescue ’s Chancellor informs the Prince that the laws of Eng-
land are “excellent in their Nature and Reason” and describes a process of 
metamorphosis, by which “use transform the Person into its very Nature.” 
Fortescue is elaborating a metaphysical conceit whereby a living person 
becomes the embodiment of an intangible ideal: perfect justice. Especially 
notable is Fortescue ’s insistence that this transformative process can occur 
only through “use” or adherence to custom. Only when the Chancellor’s 
young charge has “transcribed the Law” into his “very Habit and Disposi-
tion” will he “deservedly obtain the Character of a Just Prince.”44 In his 
definition of nature, Fortescue implies the indivisibility of custom and the 
Law of God; and further to his thesis that the laws of England are primarily 
leges non scriptae, he argues that statutes represent nothing more than the 
reduction “into Writing” of the laws of nature and custom. Selden notes of 
Fortescue ’s assertion that human laws are derived from nature, customs, or 
statutes that the law of nature is “the Law of all Places, Persons and Times, 
without Alteration, One and the same Inscription of GOD’s Power, and 
Goodness.”45
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Fortescue uses a metaphor, drawn from his knowledge of the orchards of 
Gloucestershire, with which to illustrate how privileged access to artificial 
reason transforms the recipient of such knowledge from being a “Stranger” 
to the common law into a personification of “the Rule of Justice.” The Chan-
cellor likens the young Prince to “an Apple-Stock,” onto which a scion from 
a pear tree is grafted, with the felicitous result “that both become a Pear-Tree, 
and are called so from the Fruit which they produce.” The imagery employed 
by Fortescue is intended to suggest that the fusion of “nature” (the apple tree) 
with the artificial reason of law (the grafted pear tree) will transform the host 
body into a manifestation of law itself.46 The image of the ancient constitu-
tion, evoked throughout De Laudibus, is predominantly rural. For Fortescue, 
the customs of the shires represent the unity of human reason and natural or 
divine law. This much is apparent from the metaphor of the grafted pear tree, 
above, and in the more general (but no less symbolic) and idealized descrip-
tion of the English subject of law: “Every Inhabitant is at his Liberty fully 
to use and enjoy whatever his Farm produceth, the Fruits of the earth, the 
Increase of his Flock, and the like.”47
Justice Shallow’s Gloucestershire orchard is a theatrical distillation of 
Fortescue’s bucolic imagery. Fortescue’s vision of England is prevented 
from subsiding into pastoral sentimentality by the violent historical context 
in which De Laudibus is set: the dynastic civil wars between the Houses of 
Lancaster and York. It is the same in Shakespeare’s Gloucestershire: popu-
lated though it is by “good varlet[s]” and “lusty lads,”48 the violent civil unrest 
beyond its borders reminds the audience of the fragility of ancient and im-
mutable custom and of the need to be vigilant in defense of the ancient con-
stitution. Like Fortescue’s Chancellor, Justice Shallow is a true countryman, 
skilled in the horticultural techniques described above: he invites Falstaff to 
“see my orchard, where, in an arbour, we will eat a last year’s pippin of mine 
own graffing.”49
In The Justices of the Peace in England, 1558–1640, subtitled A Later Eire-
narcha, in homage to William Lambarde, J. H. Gleason provides a valuable 
analytical insight into the local administration of justice in early modern Eng-
land. Gleason’s expansive claim, in his first sentence, that “[t]he justices of 
the peace symbolize the polity of England”50 finds dramatic resonance in the 
three Gloucestershire scenes of Part 2. Justice Shallow is neither jurist nor 
judge. Indeed, from a strict reading of Shakespeare’s play, it seems unlikely 
that he was a member of one of the Inns of Court. “I was once of Clement’s 
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Inn, where I think they will talk of mad Shallow yet,”51 he boasts to his fellow 
justice, Silence. Clement’s Inn was one of the Inns of Chancery in London, 
at which attorneys-at-law were trained.52 Fortescue’s Chancellor informs the 
Prince that in each of these (there were ten Inns of Chancery when De Lau-
dibus was written):
[T]here are an Hundred Students at the least; and, in some of them, a far greater 
Number, tho’ not constantly residing. The Students are, for the most part, young 
Men; here they Study the Nature of Original and Judicial Writs, which are the 
very first Principles of the Law: After they have made some Progress here, and 
are more advanced in Years, they are admitted into the Inns of Court.53
If Shallow had not progressed from Clement’s Inn to one of the four Inns 
of Court, his knowledge of English law would have been rudimentary. He 
misses no opportunity to remind Falstaff and Justice Silence of his youthful 
experiences in London; therefore it seems unlikely that he would have failed to 
mention adventures that befell him while a student at one of the Inns of Court. 
Characteristically, Shallow boasts to Silence of his acquaintance with young 
men from the “superior” Inns of Court: “There was I, and little John Doit 
of Staffordshire, and black George Barnes, and Francis Pickbone, and Will 
Squele, a Cotsole man—you had not four such swinge-bucklers in all the Inns 
o’Court again.”54 While a student at Clement’s Inn, Shallow almost certainly 
would have had friends and drinking companions at one of the nearby Inns of 
Court; but he never goes so far as to claim that he was a member himself. The 
four “swinge-bucklers” of the Inns of Court were John Doit, George Barnes, 
Francis Pickbone, and Will Squele: the fifth member of the gang (if his remi-
niscence is accurate)55 was Robert Shallow, of Clement’s Inn.
The traditional educational route for an aspiring common lawyer was to 
study for a degree at Oxford or Cambridge prior to a prolonged period as 
a student at one of the Inns of Court. After seven or eight years as an inner 
barrister, during which time he would participate in twelve “grand moots” at 
his Inn and twenty-four “petty moots” at an Inn of Chancery, the student was 
called to the Bar and elevated to the status of utter barrister. Utter barristers 
from the Inns of Court gave readings on particular statutes or cases at the 
Inns of Chancery, and students there participated in moots, similar to those 
at the Inns of Court.56 If as a young man Robert Shallow had attended only 
Clement’s Inn, then (according to Dugdale) his education would have been 
sporadic and less than satisfactory. There was no tutorial system and, aside 
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from the provision of readings and moots, students were left to their own 
devices. Dugdale contrasts the cloistered calm of the Inns of Court with the 
noisy commerce of the Inns of Chancery:
[I]n the Terme time they are so unquieted by Clyents and servants of Clyents, 
that resort to such as are Attorneys and practysers, that the Students may as 
quietly study in the open streets, as in their Studies. Item, they have no place to 
walk in, and talk and confer their learnings, but in the Church.57
Among J.P.s, the paucity of Shallow’s formal education would have been 
by no means unusual. Gleason records that in Worcestershire, of the fifty-two 
J.P.s extant in the year 154, only thirteen had attended Oxford or Cambridge 
as undergraduates and only sixteen had been called to the Bar. Twenty of the 
fifty-two Worcestershire justices had attended neither Oxford nor Cambridge, 
nor one of the Inns of Court.58 Shallow refers in passing to Oxford, when he 
says to Silence: “I dare say my cousin William is become a good scholar; he is 
at Oxford still, is he not?”59 But there is no textual evidence that Shallow him-
self was a student there. The only statutory qualification for appointment to the 
post of J.P. (beyond the vague requirement, expressed in 34.E.3.cap.1, that they 
should be “learned in the Lawes”) was that “None shall bee assigned Iustice of 
the Peace, if he have not landes or tenements to the value of twentie pounds by 
the yeare.”60 Of far greater importance than formal education or social status 
(beyond the requirement that a J.P. must be a landowner) was the more nebu-
lous requirement that he should be “of the Best in the Countie.”61 As Tillyard 
observes of Shallow, it matters not that at times (particularly when recalling 
his rumbustious youth as a student at Clement’s Inn) he appears ridiculous; 
the crucial point about his embodiment of unwritten law is that he “is a good 
countryman.”62 Although as a J.P., Shallow is an important functionary in the 
administration of justice, his knowledge of statutes and case law is less relevant 
to the execution of his duties as one of the King’s Justices of the Peace than his 
affinity with the unchanging customs of the English countryside.
The powers attached to the role of J.P were not inconsiderable; as Lam-
barde states, they had powers of jurisdiction and “[c]oertion,” including the 
lawful authority to pass capital sentences, “as by hanging, burning, boyling, 
or pressing.”63 But it is in the informal enforcement of unwritten law, as re-
flected in the dialogue between Shallow and his servant Davy, that the role 
of J.P. as guardian of the ancient constitution is more accurately represented. 
Tillyard describes Davy as “both administrator and politician”64 and his 
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questioning of Shallow, concerning the sowing of wheat, the shoeing of horses 
and the payment “of William’s wages”65 suggests that his role is more akin to 
that of estate manager than that of a mere servant.
The professional relationship between Shallow and Davy appears to be 
similar to that of an attorney (which Shallow would have been, had he com-
pleted his education at Clement’s Inn) and his clerk, or noverint. Davy’s first 
lines to Shallow, after greeting him, are “Marry, sir, thus: those precepts can-
not be served; and again, sir—shall we sowe the hade land with wheat?”66 
A. R. Humphreys makes the plausible suggestion that “precepts” refers to 
one of the praecipe writs:67 a form of action in which a right to enjoyment of 
property by a plaintiff was asserted over a defendant. In The Interpreter, John 
Cowell notes that praecipe “is a writ of great Diversity, both in its Form and 
Use.” Such a writ “properly signifies the Taking Possession of Lands or Tene-
ments”; for example, “where a Man demands Lands or Tenements of his own 
Seisin after the Term expired.” The relevance of praecipe to the continuation 
of antique custom in the shires of England and therefore, in more general 
terms, to the perpetuation of the ancient constitution is that (as Cowell elabo-
rates): “The Writs of Entry favour much of the Right of Property; As for 
Example: Some are to recover Customs and Services, in which are contained 
these two Words (Solet & Debet).”68 The symbolic importance of “Solet” and 
“Debet” to the claim of a higher, moral law and supreme constitutional status 
could not be more apparent, suggestive as they are of that which is customary 
and that which ought to be.
J. H. Baker compounds the idea that Shakespeare was referring in this 
scene to the rectitude of ancient and immutable custom, by describing the 
writs of praecepi as “the oldest and most solemn of actions.”69 The action was 
concerned with exercising the right of the plaintiff over property currently in 
use by the defendant, rather than with compensation for a wrong committed 
by the defendant. Therefore, it is possible that Davy’s question concerning 
the sowing of wheat on the “hade land” refers to his preceding statement that 
the “precepts” could not be served. In other words, the defendant was deny-
ing the plaintiff access to the “hade land,” thereby preventing the sowing of 
wheat. Davy had consequently attempted to serve a writ of praecipe on the de-
fendant, demanding that the plaintiff be allowed to sow wheat, but had failed. 
As Baker remarks, defendants often ignored the initial serving of the writ, 
requiring several stages in the process before the plaintiff successfully claimed 
his right over the land.70
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In response to Davy’s inquiry about whether they should sow wheat, Shal-
low replies: “With red wheat, Davy,”71 referring to the “red Lammas” variety, 
grown locally in Gloucestershire since time immemorial.72 For all his boastful 
and possibly fictitious reminiscences about his lusty youth, Shallow is at one 
with nature and the customs of rural life. Whether choosing the best variety 
of wheat or grafting “pippins” onto rootstocks, he fulfills Tillyard’s definition 
of a “good countryman.” Like his judicial descendant, Lord Denning, Shal-
low’s interpretation of law is predicated upon his respect for the customs of 
rural life.73 Such respect extends to knowing the personalities and character-
istics of individual members of the rural community; many of whom would 
be subjects of litigation, which the local J.P. would be expected to resolve. 
Hence, Davy asks Shallow to “countenance” or support his friend, “William 
Visor of Woncot against Clement Perkes a’th’Hill.”74 Shallow knows Visor 
to be an “arrant knave,”75 but Davy pleads for him on the grounds of amity: 
“at his friend’s request” and because “The knave is mine honest friend.”76 
Swayed perhaps by Davy’s touching loyalty towards his friend, Shallow de-
clares that “I say he shall have no wrong.”77
The system of justice described here by Shakespeare is Aristotelian, in the 
sense that it is dependent on the recognition that community, association, or 
friendship is central to the creation and maintenance of the polis. In Book I 
of The Politics, Aristotle uses the microcosm of the village community with 
which to demonstrate the interdependency of the various constituent mem-
bers of the state. They are “homogalactic”: literally, they suckle from the 
same source of milk.78 Of even greater relevance to the scene between Davy 
and Shallow (and to the sense that this scene alludes to the fractious state of 
England in the reign of Henry IV) is the political importance that Aristotle 
attaches to friendship in Books VIII and IX of The Nicomachean Ethics. For 
Aristotle, friendship is the bond of communities and is, he claims, more im-
portant to lawgivers even than justice; the primary objective of lawgivers is 
the attainment of concord and the elimination of faction, and concord is syn-
onymous with friendship.79
In The Book Named the Governor, Sir Thomas Elyot’s seminal work on 
governance, the commonweal, and the education of a prince, the Aristotelian 
notion of friends is interpreted in the context of advisers or counselors to the 
prince: amici principis. According to Elyot, those rulers who refuse the coun-
sel of advisers are subject to “most pernicious danger.” Discussing the best 
form of governance, Elyot quotes from Plutarch of Theopompus, King of 
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Lacedaemonia: “‘If ’ (said he) ‘the prince give to his friends liberty to speak 
to him things that be just, and neglecteth not the wrongs that his subject 
sustaineth.’”80 I shall return to Elyot in connection with the education of 
Prince Hal, with particular reference to the exchange between Hal and the 
Lord Chief Justice in Part 2, concerning Hal’s committal to prison for publicly 
striking him.81 For now, I conclude my discussion of Shallow’s Gloucestershire 
idyll with the observation that the Aristotelian notion of friendship was an es-
sential component of common law principles of fairness, equability, and social 
cohesion, forming the basis of community at a local and national level.82
Left alone, when Shallow and Davy retire to prepare for dinner, Falstaff 
reflects on “the semblable coherence of his [Shallow’s] men’s spirits and his.” 
But he misinterprets the exchange between Shallow and Davy, making the 
mistaken observation that Shallow’s servants, “by observing of him, do bear 
themselves like foolish justices; he, by conversing with them, is turned into 
a justice-like servingman.”83 Far from acting foolishly, as Falstaff surmises, 
what has occurred between them is akin to the grafting process described by 
Shallow in Act 5, Scene 3, and by Fortescue in De Laudibus. Whether by serv-
ing the writ of praecipe on their intransigent neighbor or by Shallow’s “coun-
tenancing” of Davy’s friend, William Visor, the artificial reason of the law 
has been grafted onto ancient custom: the writ will enable the “hade land” to 
be sown with “red wheat,” as it has been since time immemorial;84 the coun-
tenancing of William Visor against Clement Perkes will allow Davy’s honest 
friend to carry on his agrarian business (whatever it may be) as he always 
has. In their unity of purpose, which Falstaff mistakes for foolishness, Shal-
low and Davy display fidelity to the land and to ancient custom.85 In their 
brief, preprandial dialogue the two honest countrymen, Shallow and Davy, 
have amply demonstrated that the common or customary laws of England 
are, as Fortescue stated, “deduced from the Law of Nature.” Citing Aristo-
tle as authority for his claim that the law of nature is the ultimate source of 
English law, Fortescue quotes approvingly from Book V of The Nicomachean 
Ethics: ‘“The Law of Nature is the same, and has the same Force all the World 
over.’”86 The quotation from Aristotle might stand as a suitable subtitle for the 
three Gloucestershire scenes in Part 2.
In his delineation of the various functions of J.P.s, Lambarde ascribes to 
them a spiritual role, not dissimilar to the description by Fortescue of the ju-
diciary as “sacerdotes.” Defining the word “Peace,” Lambarde argues that 
the word “hath sundry significations in the holy Scripture: For there is an 
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inwarde, and an outward Peace. . . . Out of this proceedeth an other inwarde 
Peace, named ye Peace of Conscience, for that our conscience is (by faith in 
Christ) at Peace, both with God and itself.”87 For Lambarde, Elizabethan J.P.s 
played a central role in the maintenance of the customary laws of England and 
the protection of the ancient constitution. They were the provincial guardians 
of the nation’s conscience, considered by Gleason to be leaders of English so-
ciety and, more portentously by G. M. Trevelyan, “of the utmost significance 
for the future of our constitution and our law.”88
the Education of a Prince and “the rusty curb  
of old Father Antic the law”
Critics of Part 2 have consistently noted the play’s themes of time and time-
lessness. Indeed, Humphreys goes so far as to argue that in the course of the 
play, time becomes a “picture of the nation.”89 There is a sense in much if not 
all of the play (not least in the Gloucestershire scenes discussed above) that 
the action might be set in the early fifteenth century, the late sixteenth century, 
or somewhere in between (or after). In the context of precedent in common 
law—of past decisions acting upon and directly affecting the present case—
the observation of Lord Hastings that “[w]e are time’s subjects”90 is an ac-
curate and concise description of every litigant who ever appeared before an 
English court. Each plaintiff and defendant is subject to time, in the sense that 
the present decision of the court is contingent upon past judgments.
In a recent historicist study of the plays, Tom McAlindon notes that the 
dynastic conflicts of late medieval England were interpreted by Shakespeare 
“through the lens of Tudor experience.”91 It is certain that the issue of the suc-
cession to Elizabeth provided an underlying and general theme for the plays. 
Of more particular relevance is that the Tudor rebellions of 1536, 1547, and 
1569 (especially given the involvement of the Percys in the 1569 Northern 
Rebellion) provided Shakespeare with recent and resonant simulacra of the 
rebellions against the rule of Henry IV. Indeed, the judge who, in the spring 
of 1570, attended the assizes in York, Carlisle, and Durham for the trial of the 
Northern rebels was to become known to Shakespeare’s family for presiding 
over the trial in 153 of two of their relatives, John Somerville and Edward Ar-
den, charged with plotting to kill the Queen.92 By then the judge in question, 
Sir Christopher Wray, had been appointed Lord Chief Justice, a post that he 
held from 1574 until his death in 1592.93
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The phantasms of leading members of the judiciary inhabit the two parts 
of Henry IV, casting long shadows over Shakespeare’s depiction of the Eng-
lish legal institution. I have commented on the powerful influence of Sir John 
Fortescue and De Laudibus over the Utopian representation of the English 
countryside and its symbolic status as the embodiment of the ancient constitu-
tion. The guidance offered by De Laudibus is palpable also in the variations 
on the paternal relationship that exist respectively between Hal and Henry IV, 
the Lord Chief Justice and Falstaff. Fortescue (like Bracton before him) was 
insistent that the model prince should be as familiar with the laws of England 
as he should with martial skills. Fortescue’s Chancellor is pleased to see his 
young charge “employ your self in such Manly and Martial Exercises,” but he 
does not shirk from reminding the Prince, in a chapter entitled “An Exhorta-
tion to the Study of the Laws,” that:
it is the Duty of a King to Fight the Battles of his People, and to Judge them in 
Righteousness. (1 Kings VIII.20) Wherefore, as You divert and employ your 
self so much in Feats of Arms, so I could wish to see You Zealously affected 
towards the Study of the Laws: because, as Wars are decided by the Sword, so 
the Determination of Justice is effected by the Laws.94
If Shakespeare reached back to the late fifteenth century and De Lau-
dibus for the model of a paternal relationship between “old Father Antic 
the law”95 and the heir to the throne, he had recourse also to the early life 
of the extant Lord Chief Justice, Sir John Popham. In Part 1, the robbery 
scene at Gadshill, Kent, derives from anecdotal reportage of Popham’s al-
leged criminal past. John Aubrey writes that Popham “for several [years] 
addicted himself but little to the study of the laws, but [to] profligate com-
pany, and was wont to take a purse with them.”96 In his biography of Po-
pham, Douglas Rice argues that, as a young man, Popham and his crimi-
nal associates gathered at a hostelry in Southwark, whence they set out to 
ambush travelers on the coach road to Kent, at Shooter’s Hill, a notorious 
haunt for highwaymen.97 Prevailed upon by his wife “to lead another life, 
and to stick to the study of the law,” Popham transformed himself from 
criminal to lawyer, becoming “eminent in his calling,”98 to the extent that 
George Keeton asserted that “[t]he rugged personality and upright charac-
ter of Popham must have been in Shakespeare ’s mind during the composi-
tion of the plays.”99
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Another narrative, culled by Shakespeare from the repository of legal an-
ecdotage, concerns the exchange between the uncrowned Henry V and the 
Lord Chief Justice in Part 2. The new King asks his Chief Justice:
How might a prince of my great hopes forget
So great indignities you laid upon me?
What! Rate, rebuke, and roughly send to prison
Th’immediate heir of England?100
The Lord Chief Justice reminds the King that he was imprisoned justifiably, 
for the offense of contempt of court:
Your Highness pleased to forget my place,
The majesty and power of law and justice,
The image of the King whom I presented,
And struck me in my very seat of judgment.101
Holinshed records as fact an incident in which Prince Henry “had with his 
fist striken the cheefe iustice for sending one of his minions (upon desert) to 
prison.”102 The earliest account of this story is in Elyot’s The Book Named the 
Governor, first published in 1532. Elyot does not record the Prince striking the 
Lord Chief Justice, merely that he “all in a fury, all chafed, and in a terrible 
manner, came up to the place of judgment.” Elyot quotes the Lord Chief Jus-
tice’s public rebuke of the Prince, in the Court of King’s Bench, as follows:
I keep here the place of the King, your sovereign lord and father. To whom ye 
owe double obedience, wherefore eftsoons in his name I charge you to desist 
of your wilfulness and unlawful enterprise, and from henceforth give good ex-
ample to those hereafter shall be your proper subjects. And now for your con-
tempt and disobedience, go you to the prison of the King’s Bench, whereunto 
I commit you.103
In a treatise entitled “The Story of Prince Henry of Monmouth and Chief-
Justice Gascoign,” Sir Frederick Solly-Flood argues that the “quotation” by 
Elyot is fictitious. He states that spoken English “was not used on the Bench” 
during the reign of Henry IV, implying that judges would have addressed 
the court in law-French or Latin.104 Solly-Flood provides no authority for his 
claim, and as early as 1363, a statute was enacted (36.E.3.cap.15) that decreed 
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that henceforth court proceedings should be conducted in English rather 
than law-French. Baker has indicated that the proceedings of the court were 
formally recorded in Latin text;105 but ex tempore oral interventions from the 
Bench, such as that claimed by Elyot, would probably have been in English. 
More convincing is Solly-Flood’s argument that, during Sir William Gascoi-
gne’s tenure of the office of Chief Justice (1400–1413), there was no “prison 
of the King’s Bench”: convicted prisoners were committed to the custody of 
a marshal of the court [“Committitur marescallo”], who was responsible for 
their safekeeping. The prisoner was thus “in custodia marescalli” rather than 
“in prisona Domini.”106
Solly-Flood plausibly suggests that Elyot derived the story from a written 
judgment in the Court of King’s Bench, during the reign of Edward I (34 Ed. 
I: more than eighty years before Prince Henry of Monmouth was born). The 
relevant paragraph records that the then Prince of Wales, in contempt of the 
Court of King’s Bench, had used gross and bitter language [“verba grossa et 
acerba”] against the Chief Justice, for which offense the King (rather than, 
in Elyot’s account, the Chief Justice) banished his son from his presence for 
six months [“et hospicio suo fere per dimidium annum amovit”].107 There is no 
record in the above account of the Prince of Wales striking the Chief Jus-
tice. Apart from Shakespeare’s acquaintance with the story from Elyot’s The 
Governor, he would have seen a dramatized version of the altercation in the 
anonymous The Famous Victories of Henry the Fifth, entered in the Stationers’ 
Register in May 1594, but performed in the mid-150s by The Queen’s Men.108 
In that play, the Prince “giveth him [the Lord Chief Justice] a boxe on the 
eare,” for passing sentence on one of his thieving companions, Cutbert Cut-
ter. The Lord Chief Justice commits the Prince to Fleet Prison and Cutter 
to Newgate Prison, “until the next Sises”;109 there is no reference to Elyot’s 
“prison of the King’s Bench.”
I have dwelt on the origins of the story in order to emphasize the impor-
tance of its source to Shakespeare. Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Scotland 
and Ireland and Hall’s The Union of the Noble and Illustre Famelies of Lancaster 
and York were both sources for the historical content of Henry IV, Parts 1 and 2 
(Hall’s work begins with the accession of Henry IV in 1399 and includes a 
chapter entitled “The unquiet time of King Henry the Fourth”). But with 
reference to the education of a prince and the impact of this upon his capacity 
to govern in the best interests of the commonweal, Elyot’s The Governor was 
obviously the greater influence. While Solly-Flood is almost certainly correct 
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in doubting the veracity of Elyot’s “quotation” from Sir William Gascoigne, 
C.J., his statement that The Governor “has no claim whatever to be considered 
anything but a story book” is a major interpretive error.110 As John Guy has 
noted, the humanist literature of the Tudor era (heavily influenced as it was 
by the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero) was republican in theme, to the 
extent that it displayed a preference for limited monarchy. Guy notes that The 
Governor was interpreted by many commentators of the early modern period 
as a critique of the Henrician Imperium.111
In view of its republican tone, it is unsurprising that The Governor gained 
considerable critical attention after the abolition of the monarchy in 1649. In-
deed, in Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes explicitly criticized the type of humanist 
education advocated by Elyot in The Governor. Hobbes was forthright in his 
condemnation of the classical texts to which Elyot refers, claiming that they 
instilled in those who read them a range of subversive and violent republican 
sentiments.112 His contemporary (and an apologist for the theory of the divine 
right of kings), Robert Filmer, disagreed fundamentally with Hobbes’s theory 
of the social contract but was similarly dismissive of the classical sources of 
The Governor; describing Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero as “heathen authors, 
who were ignorant of the manner and creation of the world.”113 At the core 
of Hobbes’s opposition to humanist literature and its origins in the classical 
world was the distinction he made between lex and ius. For Hobbes, liberty of 
the citizen had been mistakenly elevated by the Athenians and the Romans to 
the harmful status of a formal right, thus threatening the sovereign power of 
the supreme magistrate. Hobbes made the identical observation of Sir Edward 
Coke, in A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws 
of England, accusing him of failing to recognize that a right is a liberty only to 
do that which a law does not forbid.114
“You shall be as a father to my youth”:  
Symbolism and the common Law
The historical inaccuracy of the reported altercation between Prince Henry 
and Sir William Gascoigne, C.J. is less important than its allegorical status as 
an illustration of the subjugation of the crown to the sovereignty of common 
law. Shakespeare’s Chief Justice informs Hal that he was imprisoned not for 
the assault upon his person, but for his assault upon the institution that the of-
fice of Chief Justice represents: the law itself, embodied by the office of Lord 
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Chief Justice. The Chief Justice is conscious of the persuasive power of legal 
iconography, reminding Hal that the office he holds is “[t]he image of [the 
King’s] power”115 and that it is “[t]he image of the King”116 that he embodies 
when he sits in judgment. He poses Hal the hypothetical question whether, if 
he had a son, he would allow him to “spurn at your most royal image.”117 He 
is mindful too of the symbolism inherent in the role of the father, using the 
words “father” and “son” seven times in the same speech. His relationship 
with Hal is one of several variants on the paternal relationship that Shake-
speare incorporates into the two plays.
The symbol of fatherhood, of an imaginary father to whom all true subjects 
of law owe allegiance and from whom all law originates, is a metaphysical 
conceit to which judges and jurists of the early modern period made allusion. 
Hence Coke refers variously to Moses, Brutus, the Druids, and King Arthur as 
definitive founders and authors of English law.118 The intention was to locate 
the ultimate source of legitimate constitutional authority, an issue of immense 
practical significance as successive Tudor monarchs sought, through increased 
use of the royal prerogative, to wrest jurisdiction from the courts of common 
law and relocate it in the person of the monarch. The mysterious authority of 
an invisible power, vying for sovereignty with the tangible presence of a phys-
ical actuality, is the theme of the Case of the Duchy of Lancaster (1561), reported 
by Plowden in The Commentaries or Reports. Plowden’s comment that “the 
king has in him two bodies, viz. a body natural and a body politic” provided 
the historical and intellectual foundation for Ernst H. Kantorowicz’s magiste-
rial study of medieval kingship and theology, The King’s Two Bodies. Kantoro-
wicz places appropriate emphasis on the relevance of Plowden’s statement to 
Shakespeare’s Richard II, which Kantorowicz describes as “the tragedy of the 
King’s Two Bodies.”119 That Shakespeare was familiar with Plowden is evi-
dent from his informed allusion to Hales v. Petit (1562) in the graveyard scene 
in Hamlet. The report in Hales of the suicide by drowning of Sir James Hales, 
“not having God before his eyes, but seduced by the art of the Devil,”120 was a 
profound influence over Shakespeare’s treatment of the burial of Ophelia.
The primary relevance of the Case of the Duchy of Lancaster to the present 
study of Shakespeare’s Henry IV is that it concerns a contested lease, of land 
originally belonging to the House of Lancaster:
[T]he dutchy of Lancaster came to the said king Henry 4. by descent on the 
part of his mother, and in this case if he had not afterwards been king, his  
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possessions should have passed by livery and seizin, and attornment, &c. in the 
same manner as the possessions of other subjects ought to pass. But after he had 
deposed king Richard 2. and had assumed upon him the royal estate, and so had 
conjoined to his natural body the body politic of this realm, and was become 
king, then the possessions of the dutchy of Lancaster were in him as king.121
The legitimacy of succession lies at the heart of the case. By virtue of the 
mysterious, binding power of the body politic, the land subsequently passed 
from the House of Lancaster to successive monarchs, until Edward VI made 
a lease of it during his minority. Plowden succinctly records the issue before 
the court: “[I]f the present queen shall be bound by this lease made by king 
Edward 6 or if she shall avoid it by reason of the nonage of the said king.” The 
lease was binding, because of the supernatural authority of the body politic:
[A]lthough he has or takes the land in his natural body, yet to this natural body 
is conjoined his body politic, which contains his royal estate and dignity, and 
the body politic includes the body natural, but the body natural is the lesser, and 
with this the body politic is consolidated.122
A vision of good governance, the body politic, is held to be of greater legit-
imacy than a corporeal entity, the body natural. Although it is at least arguable 
that the judgment was based upon an equitable interpretation of the relevant 
legislation,123 the decision in the Case of the Duchy of Lancaster (in particular its 
reference to the subsumption by the body politic of the body natural) marks 
the triumph of metaphysics over reason, and demonstrates also the impor-
tance of the image as a persuasive tool in early modern forensic rhetoric.
In strict, Roman legal terminology, the image or imago was the social rep-
resentation of the father, in symbolic terms the ultimate lawgiver. As pater-
familias, the Roman father had power that mirrored that of the emperor.124 
His authority was absolute; he was lex loquens—the living, speaking law. In 
historical terms, the decision of Henry IV to govern in accordance with the 
power inherent in his personal, royal authority as parens patriae was the cause 
of much of the civil unrest that Shakespeare dramatized in the two plays. Si-
mon Walker has identified several instances of rebellion in the early years 
of Henry’s reign, when local populaces rebelled against the authority of the 
King; not on the basis of his questionable dynastic right to the crown, but 
rather because they resented the assertion of a monarchic power that quashed 
their “communal preference for self-regulation.”125 It is the conflict between 
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the Imperium of the monarch and the desire for communal self-regulation that 
Elyot addresses tangentially and allegorically in The Governor, and that Shake-
speare confronts more directly in the two parts of Henry IV. I have attempted 
to demonstrate that the Gloucestershire scenes of Part 2 offer a dramatic rep-
resentation of a community governed by customary law, in accordance with 
the rights guaranteed English subjects by the ancient constitution. The Lord 
Chief Justice also upholds the law at a local, communal level, making his au-
thoritative presence felt on the streets of London (where he first encounters 
Falstaff ) and in the Boar’s Head tavern, tempering the rigor of law with hu-
manity, humor and equable judgment.
Of the three paternal relationships that Hal experiences (with King Henry, 
Falstaff, and the Lord Chief Justice), his association with the Lord Chief Jus-
tice is the only one to survive until the end of Part 2, by which time Henry IV 
is dead and Falstaff banished. Norman Sanders makes the important observa-
tion that both Falstaff and King Henry are kings of misrule: the former, for 
contriving to corrupt the heir to the throne, “like his ill angel,”126 the latter 
for usurping the throne.127 Both must be sacrificed before the moral and legal 
order can be restored.128 In their dealings with Hal throughout the two plays, 
Falstaff and King Henry appear as distorted representations of the same im-
age of decay: the aged father, vying for the attention of his errant son.129 In 
the end, Hal chooses to bind the body politic of the king to the only legitimate 
paternal model: the symbolic father of law, the Lord Chief Justice.
Stephen Greenblatt has observed that the emphatic character trait of Hal 
in Part 1 is his skill at improvised role-playing.130 Hal loves to act and he plays 
numerous roles, for his own and others’ enjoyment. He continues to impro-
vise in Part 2, disguising himself again in order to entrap Falstaff and prove 
him “a globe of sinful continents.”131 If the playacting in Part 2 is less spon-
taneous and exuberant than in Part 1, it has greater emotional impact for the 
serious intent with which Hal invests it. Hal’s impersonation of the “drawer” 
[tavern-boy] in Part 2 lacks the comic vitality (and the inventive dialogue) of 
his impressions of Hotspur, Lady Percy, and the King in Part 1; but his pur-
pose in the Boar’s Head tavern of Part 2 is to draw Falstaff “out by the ears,”132 
thereby to incriminate him as a defamer of royalty. The Star Chamber pun-
ishment for defamation of the crown would have been to “have his ears cut 
off,”133 in light of which Falstaff ’s eventual (and temporary) banishment by 
the King, “Not to come near our person by ten mile,”134 is an unusually lenient 
sentence.135
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As Greenblatt notes of Part 1, theatricality is the essential means through 
which power is expressed.136 This is no less true of Part 2, particularly when 
Hal is playing his most challenging role to date, that of King Henry V. The 
theatre of kingship is expressed by Hal in his first line as monarch, when he 
compares his regal status to a costume: “This new and gorgeous garment, 
majesty, / Sits not so easy on me as you think.”137 Despite his initial nervous-
ness, Hal immediately demonstrates that his aptitude for and experience of 
improvised theatricality have prepared him for the royal stage, which he must 
now inhabit as king. He is astutely aware that the power of the king is depen-
dent upon belief by his subjects in the particular image of kingship that he 
reflects.138 Without hesitation, he modestly presents himself as a king, not only 
under God but under law; no absolute monarch this: “Not Amurath an Amu-
rath succeeds, / But Harry Harry.”139 Twice in the last act, we are reminded 
that Henry V will govern as a king in Parliament140 and not, like Richard II, as 
“The deputy elected by the Lord.”141
Promises of symbolic fatherhood abound; after announcing to the Princes 
that “I’ll be your father and your brother too,”142 he offers his hand to the Lord 
Chief Justice, proclaiming that “You shall be as a father to my youth”:143 the 
new King casts himself as both symbolic father and son of the law. Falstaff, 
“that reverend Vice, that grey Iniquity, that father Ruffian,”144 has been ex-
posed as an idol: in strict classical terms, he is nothing more than the reflection 
of a lie. In binding himself to the icon and father of English law, the Lord 
Chief Justice, Henry V embraces truth and rejects falsehood. He is the true 
image of majesty, a model of accountable kingship and limited monarchy, as 
proposed across the centuries by Bracton, Fortescue and Coke:
[T]he King is under no man, but only God and the law, for the law makes the 
King: therefore let the King attribute that to the law, which from the law he hath 
received, to wit, power and dominion: for where will, and not law doth sway, 
there is no King.145
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